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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14251

LELAND FACER AND ROBERT
W. SHIELDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
>••:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

uf,

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was convicted of violating 61-1-1 Utah
Code Ann. (1953), (a stock fraud) and sentenced to three
years in prison in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
sentence and dismissal of the charges or, in the alternative,
remand for a new trial.

x

,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
The defendant in this action, Leland Jack Facer, was a
heavy trader in the over-the-counter stock market.

During

the time in question, he was trading heavily in the stock of
Great Northern Corporation, West Am Corporation, and Silver
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Gull Oil and Gas.
The defendant,
Mr. Facer, traded at various

brokerage houses, some of whom are claimed to be victims
in this case. Mr. Facer also tradedf not only in his own
account, but in accounts of other or in what was called
during the course of the trial, "nominee accounts." Mr.
Facer was executing what was known as locally as "float trades"
or by the Securities and Exchange Commission as "wash trades".
A "float trade" or a "wash trade" is essentially a sale by
a person through one brokerage house wherein he collects cash
immediately upon the sale and the purchase of that same
stock by that same person in another brokerage house wherein
the person has approximately seven days within which to pay
for the sale.

In essence, the person executing a "float

trade" has secured himself a very short term loan where an
interest rate is equal to the brokerage commission for executing
the trades.
The scheme as alleged by the prosecution in this action
is that the defendant, Jack Facer, would execute these so-called
"float trades" by selling stock at Continental Securities, a
brokerage firm in Salt Lake City and purchasing that same
stock through various other Salt Lake brokerage firms including
M. L. Fallick and Company, Mountain States Securities, Inc.,
Heymond-Christiansen, Inc., Edward J. Mawod and Company and
Union Securities, Inc.

The prosecution contends, as was

admitted by the defendant, that he collected cash upon the
day of sale from Continental Securities but had seven days

2
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within which to pay for the purchases at the above mentioned
brokerage firms. The purchases that were made at the above
mentioned brokerage firms were made in "nominee accounts"
which the prosecution contends were also victims of the socalled "scheme".

The named victims in such a category were

William Birkinshaw, James Xarthos and Clifford Hughes.
Although it is unclear from the face of the information
exactly how the defendant was alleged to have schemed to
defraud the so-called victims, the bill of particulars accompanying the complaint outlined a plan alleged to have
constituted a scheme to defraud.

That bill of particulars is

found in the record on pages 37 through 53.

In essence the

bill of particulars contends that the defendant set up these
"nominee accounts" for the purpose of deceiving not only the
persons whose names were being used, but also the brokerage
firms wherein such accounts were used.

For example, the

allegations are that the account of James Xarthos and Clifford
Hughes were used by the defendant at Mountain States Securities
when in fact neither James Xarthos nor Clifford Hughes knew
that their names were being used and that Mountain States
Securities did not know that James Xarthos and Clifford Hughes
were not in fact using their account. According to the
prosecution, the defendant would execute sale through Continental
Securities, collecting cash on the day of the sale, and
execute purchases through the other named brokerage houses
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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through the various nominee accounts. While such has not been
denied by the defendant, the purpose for his doing so was
contested.
fold:

The prosecution claimed that the purpose was two

(1) To manipulate the stock market; and (2) to vic-

timize the brokerage firms and nominee accounts by not paying
for the purchases when they were due and they alleged the
defendant never intended to pay for said purchases at the time
the purchase order was placed.

Finally, the prosecution alleged

that as a part of a scheme to defraud, the defendant did
deliver insufficient funds check as payment for the accounts
wherein the purchases were made.
The defendant, on the other hand, admitted that he had
used "nominee accounts" but asserted that both the brokerage
firms in fact knew that the accounts were nominee accounts of
his and that the persons whose accounts were being used knew
and had given permission for him to use those accounts. While
the defendant admitted the "float trades" - the sales at
Continental Securities and purchases through other brokerage
firms of the same stock - the defendant asserted affirmatively
that the reason for so doing was two-fold:

(1) To create

short-term loans to himself, so he could pay for stock he had
previously purchased; and (2) to purchase stock that he hoped
was increasing in price but he did not in fact have the money
so to do and when it came time to pay for said stock he was
required to sell other stock to raise funds for the earlier

4
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purchase and, still wishing to retain said stock, would
purchase the same stock that he sol d at different brokerage
firms.

While the defendant acknowledges that his wife's

checks were used to pay for the purchases when there was insufficient funds to cover said checks, the defendant asserted
that such was done without his knowledge and while he was
out of town and the brokers never di d anything in re] iance
on said checks.
Charges were brought originally against four defendants and
i ncludod two separate complaints total ling twelve counts again.-* •..
each defendant.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution had
given immunity to one of the defendants to testify against the
remaining defendants; at the preliminary hearing alJ counts
were dismissed as to the defendant's wife, Barbara Facer, and

'

the defendant Jack Facer and the defendant Robert Shields were
bound over to trial on one count of stock fraud while the
remaining eleven counts were dismissed,

: :\oi: ly prior to the

trial, the prosecution gave immunity to Robert Shields so that
he would testify against the defendant on the one count remaining,
So of the 48 felony counts that were originally brought, one
went to trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY
AS TO THE ELEMENT OF RELIANCE IN A STOCK FRAUD ACTION.
In accordance with the Utah case of S & F Supply Company
vs. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (1974) the defendant requested proposed
jury instructions on the element of reliance.

The Utah Supreme

Court in S & F Supply Company, supra, stated:
"As was correctly observed/ by the Second Circuit Court,
. . . 'some form of the traditional scienter requirement1
. . . is preserved . . . whether it be termed lack of
diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or
negligent conduct, . . . [that] . . . standard . . .
promotes the deterrant objective of the rule." (Citing
S.E.C. vs. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 2 Cir., 401 F.2d 833,
854-855. and S.E.C. vs. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S.
180 192-193, 84 S.Ct. 275 11 L.ed. 2d 237).
"Correlated to the above, it has also been said that this
statute does not require the buyer to prove the element
of his own reliance on the false representation. It is
true that the statute does not expressly so state. But
all of the law cannot be written in one sentence or in
one statute. Thus, in any other statute, must be considered in its relation to the total fabric of the law
and be so interpreted and applied as to be consistent
with the common sense, and with elemental principles of
justice. It follows that the statute cannot be fairly
be understood in meaning that a buyer can naively or
blindly purchase stocks without concern for the truth
or reasonableness of representations made, then if it
later develops that it would serve this interest, assert
a claim of falsity of that representation about which he
previously had no concern, and upon which he placed no
reliance, as a basis for avoiding his contract."
In accordance with such statement, the defendant requested
the following proposed jury instruction:

Defendant proposed

that Instruction No. 6:
"Members of the jury, you are instructed that the
prosecution has charged that the above mentioned victims
were deceived by the plan or artifice described above,
that they relied on said plans to their detriment. If
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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you fail to find such beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant not guilty". (RT-121).
Also, the defendant's proposed Instruction No. 8 which
was refused by the court, reads as follows:
"Members of the jury, you are instructed that in order
to convict the defendant you must find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the above conduct by the
defendant constituted a scheme, artifice or device and
that the defendants did wilfully and intentionally execute
that scheme or device for the purpose of defrauding the
above named victims and that the above alleged victims
were in fact defrauded and did rely on said scheme to
their detriment. If you fail to find beyond a reasonable
doubt from the evidence that any of the above was true,
then you must acquit the defendant." (R-123).
Also, the defendant's proposed Instruction No. 13, which
was refused by the Judge, read:
"Members of the jury, you are instructed that the requirement of defrauding is defined to mean that the plan, or
course of conduct was used for the purpose of deceiving
certain enumerated victims by having them rely thereon
to their detriment."
The prosecution's theory was that the purchasing brokerage
firms did not know Jack Facer was selling at Continental Securities
nor did they know he was buying at their brokerage firms because he used nominees.

In essence, the charge is he ommitted

to tell the "victims" he was on both sides of the transactions
and they were relying on him not being both the seller and the
buyer.
It is the defendant's position that the element of "reliance"
is an integral part of the crime of scheming to defraud and that
failure to so instruct was prejudicial error.

There is ample

evidence in the record from which the jury could have found, if
they had been instructed that the enumerated victim did not rely
upon the misrepresentations, omissions or conduct of the defendants.
With respect to the question of "float trades" the soDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
called victim
Mawod
testified:
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I believe it was your previous testimony that a "float
trade is a common practice in the Utah brokerage
industry, isn't that correct?
I don't know, it would happen quite often in this area,
what would be regarded as common practice, the drawn
line or not, I don't know.
Isn't it true that the purpose for such a practice,
I believe your testimony was, was to raise short-term
cash?
Yes sir. (RT-65)
Howard Morgan, an agent and trader for the so-called
M. L. Fallick & Company testified at (R-215) (RT-215).

Randall:
Mr. Morgan, did you execute any directed trades for
Mr. Facer?
Yes.
What did that consist of?
Well, we had a settlement date, we needed the cash and
he needed to raise funds. He would tell me to buy some
stock in one account and buy from another broker.
And did he tell you the market price or anything of
that nature?
Yes.
And when you did those trades did you always find the
stock available?
Yes.
What companies were you directed to trade at?
Continental Securities, Union, Kesco, Trans American,
several brokerage houses.
Did you have any knowledge at all about whether or not
Jack Facer might have been on the other side of these
trades?
Well, I assumed he was, let's put it that way. There's
no way I would have actually known of this. (RT-233).

8
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On cross-examination the trader for Fallick testified:
Q.

Mr. Morgan, if I can paraphrase your testimony, let me
ask you if you did testify that at the end or - the
question was, did you execute directed trades for Mr.
Facer and you indicated at the end "we had a settlement
date, we had to meet and he didn't have funds so we
did "float trades", is that a correct statement of
your testimony?

A.

I didn't mean - I mean there were trades, there were
settlement dates that were due and in order to take
care of this Mr. Facer would do directed trades, yes.

Q.

And you knew about it?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And it didn't deceive you at all that he was doing it?

A.

That's the only way we had to get the money, he didn't
deceive me.

Q.

As a matter of fact, he took the money that he got on
the cash end and brought it over to M. L. Fallick &
Company to pay for the earlier trades?

A.

Correct.

(RT-237-238).

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Morgan testified:
Q.

But you do know while you were an employee of M. L.
Fallick & Company that these were in fact "float trades"?

A.

I would say that they were directed trades to raise
money to pay for other trades.

Q.

And M. L. Fallick & Company got the money?

A.

Some of the money.

Another so-called victim, William Birkinshaw, who was also
an agent for the alleged victim Union Securities testified:
Q.

A.

Did you become aware that he (Jack Facer) was both
buying and selling significiant amounts of Great
Northern, Silver Gull and West Am?
You are talking about the initial time of my acquaintance
with
Mr.
Facer?
Digitized by the
Howard
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Q.

No, through the series of meetings in the morning?

A.

Oh, I later found out certainly that he was trading.
He was buying and selling.

Q.

Did you ever have any occasion to find out if Mr. Facer
was doing any cross trading or "float trading" or whatever you would want to call it?

A.

Well, toward the latter part.

Q.

Before the checks bounced, did you become aware that
he was "float trading"?

A.

Yes, I know that he was a buyer and seller.

Q.

How long before the checks bounced did you learn this?

A.

Oh, a month.

(RT-255)

On cross-examination he testified:
Q.

Isn't it true Mr. Birkinshaw that at one of your meetings in late March you sat down and discussed that there
were settlement dates approaching and no one had any
money?

A.

You say, did I?

Q.

Was that discussed at a meeting?

A.

It could have been, I don't recall.

Q.

And wasn't it also discussed that the man was to sell
some stock to Continental to get cash to cover the
settlement date and for you to buy it at Union Securities
and for Howard Morgan to buy it at Fallick?

A.

Could have been, yes. . .

Q.

And isn't it true and a fact that the monies that
were collected from those sales were taken up and given
to Fallick, Mawod, Union Securities?

A.

I don't recall.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q.

Do you remember this, did Mr, Jack Facer make any money
off those "directed trades"?

A.

I don't see how he could have.

Q.

That's because all of the money was going back to Fallick
and Mawod and Union, isn't that correct, and Heymond
and Christiansen?

A,

And other brokers may have been involved.

(RT 277-278) .

Another so-called victim was Clifford Hughes who was a
customerat the so-called victim Mountain States Securities (the
remaining individual victim was James Xarthos but he was deceased
at the time of trial and so no evidence was introduced to
be received as to Xarthos (RT 347-348).

Mr Hughes testified:

A.

He just asked if it was all right if he bought and
sold stock through one of my accounts and I said yes.
(RT-180) . . . If Mr. Facer called me on the phone
and asked me to buy some stock at Mountain States
Securities and directed them them to buy it from Continental Securities.

Q.

When was that?

A.

It was in the early part of 1973

Q.

What stock was that?

A.

In Silver Gull.

Q.

And did Mr. Facer instruct you at what price you were
to obtain that?

A.

Yes, he did. He said to buy it, it think at 11 cents
or 8 cents or something, I will have to see the total
confirmation, I don't remember the exact price, but
he told me how much to pay for it and who to buy it
from and I instructed Mountain States to do this and
they called back very shortly thereafter and said
they could buy some stock cheaper and I told them to
go back to Continental and buy the stock that was
ordered.

Q.

And when they told you that they had bought it cheaper
than what Jack told you to buy it for did you at that
point call Jack and inform him of that fact?

A.

....

Yes, I called him and told him because I thought it
was
Digitized byfunny.
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Q.

What did he say when you told him that Mountain States
bought it cheaper?

A.

He at that time had told Mountain States to go ahead
and buy the other stock through Continental so it
was just more or less a joke at that time.

Q.

You had already informed Mountain States to go back in
and buy it when Jack Facer told them at a higher price?

A. Yes.
Q.

Would you tell Jack Facer that?

A.

Yes

Q.

What would he say?

A.

Like I said at the time it had all been done, it was funny
then.

Q.

Why was it funny?

A.

Well, just being able to buy it on the market cheaper
than it would normally have been bought for.

Q.

. . . Or you allowed him to use your account?

A.

Yes, I do not believe there were any sales made in
any account, just purchases.

Q.

But also that was done fully with you knowledge?

A.

Yes*

Q.

And also this later transaction in Mountain States was
done fully with your knowledge?

A.

Yes.

(RT-189).

It seems clear from the evidence that Mr. Facer did not deceive
any of the so-called victims through the use of "float trades."
The prosecution's theory; i.e., that the defendant Facer omitted
to tell persons material facts; that he was the seller on
the other side of purchases; simply does not hold water when
weighed in view of the evidence.

At least, Mr. Facer should

have obtained a proper instruction as to the law of reliance
because if in fact the so-called victiits did not rely on the
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omission that he was on the other side of the sale, then Mr.
Facer should have been acquitted of the charge.
It was also the prosecution's theory that the use of nominee
accounts was deceiving to both the nominees used and the brokerage firms at which the nominees were used.

In essence the theory

was that the brokerage firms were relying upon these individual
persons and did not in fact know that Mr. Facer was behind
these accounts. Again, in view of the evidence, such holds
very little weight:

Mr. Morgan, the agent of M. L. Fallick &

Company testified:
Q.

You indicated you did several trades for Mr. Facer in
these nominee accounts, is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Did he at any time try to deceive you in any way or
manner by saying they weren't his accounts?

A. No.
Q.

It was fully disclosed and you weren't defrauded in
any manner by using nominee accounts?

MR, MCCARTHY*

Objection.

Mr. McCarthy's objection to the word defraud was sustained.
Q.

You were not deceived by his use of nominee accounts?

A.

I would say no, I wasn't.

And Mr. Mawod, the principal of Edward J. Mawod & Company
testified:
Q.

And in addition to the "float trades", Mr. Mawod,
was the use of nominees pretty common practice in the
Utah brokerage industry?

A.

Yes.

(RT-65).

Mrs. Fallick, the principal of M. L. Fallick & Company also
testified she knew Mr. Facer controlled the accounts (RT 120-121).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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And at Union Securities the agent for Union established the
nominee accounts for Facer.

Bill Birkinshaw, a broker at

Union and a so-called victim testified:
Q.

All right, in your representation of Mr. Facer at
Union Securities, did you have occasion to set up
other accounts for him other than in his own name?

A.

I don't recall whether his wife had an account but
throughout the business with Mr. Facer we used nominee
accounts . . . .

Q.

All right, can you remember the nominee accounts you
established for Mr. Facer?

A.

These were my accounts that gave permission for me to
execute trades as long as they were paid for, now
we used Duane Day, Stan Nelson, Don Dorton and I think
it was Stuart Sargent, but that's all I could recall,
there could have been more.

Q.

But all of those individuals gave you permission to
use their accounts?

A.

I asked them for permission prior to the first trade
in each case.

It seems difficult in light of the above testimony for the
prosecution to contend that Mr. Facer's use of nominee accounts
deceived both the nominee and the brokerage firms at which the
accounts were used.

However, at least the jury should have

been instructed regarding the matter of reliance.

If, in fact,

the brokerage firms were relying on these individual nominees
as having placed their own orders and intending to pay for
them rather than their being used simply as nominees, then a
case could be made.

However, in view of the above testimony,

they could not reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that such was the case, particularly if the jury had been so
instructed.
The final part of the so-called scheme was the use of
insufficient funds checks to pay for the purchases in the
various brokerage
accounts. It should be pointed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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out that the testimony was almost unanimous that the defendant
Jack Facer was not in town at the time the checks were issued
but the checks were not on his account, but on his wife's,
that the so-called victim Bill Birkinshaw and Robert Shields
obtained the checks from Mr, Facer's wife and negotiated them
without Mr. Facer's knowledge and while Mr. Facer was out of
town.

(RT-285) (RT 278-279) (RT-239-240).

Further, no consideration passed at the time the insufficient
funds checks were delivered and, therefore, they could not
possibly have been fraudulent in and of themself from the
classical sense.

(See e.g. RT-70, 150). The checks were

delivered some seven days after the purchases and nothing was
delivered to the customer at the time he delivered his check.
Even assuming that the defendant executed the checks and
assuming that he delivered the checks, and assuming that he
was in town at the time the checks were negotiated and assuming
that the checks were on his account, and assuming that proceeds
were delivered by the brokers at the time the checks were tendered,
it is the defendant's position that the same would still not
be fraudulent as the brokers who acquired said checks knew,
at the time they acquired them, that there may not be sufficient
funds to cover the checks. Mr. Birkinshaw, the broker at
Union Securities, a so-called victim, and Mr. Birkinshaw
himself was alleged to be a victim, testified as follows:
Q.

And isn't it true in a particular period of time when
settlement dates came up and Mr. Facer was out of town
in Las Vegas, Nevada?

A.

Yes, he would have been out of town towards the middle
or first week of April as I recall.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q.

And isn't it true that at that particular time both
you and Mr. Shields got together and separately went
to Barbara Facer and got some checks from her that were
signed in blank?

A.

This I don't recall.

Q.

Isn't it true that some of those checks that you obtained
from Mrs Facer were delivered to Union Securities?

A.

I delivered settlement checks to Union Securities from
Barbara Facer, yes.

Q.

And you knew fully well there were insufficient funds
to cover those checks?

A.

All of the checks?

Q.

The checks that bounced at the end that were part of
this law suit.

A.

I had no way of being positive because I didn't have
their account at First Security Bank. How would I
know?

Q.

You're hedging a little, you though there were insufficient funds.

A.

I thought there was a possibility that the checks may
not be good at the time they were cashed.

Q.

You asked Carl Seljaas to take one of those checks
to take it into Union Securities because you were too
embarrassed because you knew there were insufficient
funds.

A.

I don't recall making that statement to Mr. Seljaas.

Q.

Is it possible that you could have been?

A.

Possible.

In order for a scheme to be fraudulent, there must be
some intent at the time the misrepresentations were made or
that a course of conduct was indulged in that the victim
should rely on such.
P.2d 127 (1974)).

( S & F Supply Company v. Hunter, 527

The evidence in the instant case is such

that the jury could have found that none of the victims relied
on the course of conduct, misrepresentations or omissions
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nor did the defendant intend that they do so.
the defendant should have been acquitted.

In such a case

However, as the jury

received no instructions on the elements of reliance, a jury
verdict in favor of the defendant on this basis would have been
contrary to the instructions of the Court.

Therefore, it was

in error for the court to refuse proposed instructions concerning reliance.

This Court has one of two alternatives:

(1) They may either review the evidence as noted herein as
showing that there was no possibility for reliance; or that the
defendant intended the victims to rely and reverse the trial
court and enter a judgment of acquittal or, (2) on the other hand,
the Court may remand for a new trial in accordance with instructions concerning the element of reliance.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF "UNCLEAN HANDS".
The evidence in this case as quoted above was replete
and was pervaded with implications that the "so-called victims"
were in fact, knowledgeably involved in all parts of the transactions.

(See the testimony of Clifford Hughes quoted above

and of Bill Birkinshaw and Howard Morgan, all quoted above.)
There can be no doubt that these witnesses for certain knew
all aspects of the "alleged scheme" and yet participated
therein.

However, the prosecution called these witnesses

victims.

The evidence and the testimony of the other so-called

victims indicate that they may have been more aware of the
situation than they would let on.

The jury might well have

found that the so-called victims were, in fact, involved in
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was one.

The defendant requested a jury instruction:
"Members of the jury, you are further instructed that
the securities laws of the State of Utah are designed
to protect the unsophisticated and unwary and that in
/ order to be found guilty of the crime charged, the
victims enumerated must not have been aware of or
participated in the alleged scheme, plan or course of
conduct.
The doctrine of unclean hands is a defense for stock fraud.
See Cartier v. Button, CCH Par. 91, 540 (1964-1966) transferred
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1965) Volume II, Bromberg Securities LawFraud, Page 253, Section 11.5 (1968) E. D.
If, in fact, the so-called victims were indeed knowing
participants in the so-called scheme, if there was one, then
the defendant should have been acquitted.

The failure to so

instruct the jury was prejudicial error when there was, in fact
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the
victims did, in fact, participate.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTUARY RULINGS WERE, TO A
LARGE PART, ERRONEOUS AND, IN SEVERAL PARTICULAR
AREAS LED TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The trial court, over objection of defense counsel, allowed
the jury to hear evidence concerning the history and defendant's
association with a company known as Great Northern.

The evidence

was objected to as irrelevant and remote as the prosecution
was examining about events that occurred from the spring of
1972 through February of 1973.

The information alleges a

scheme which began on March 20 of 1973 and the defendant
contended that his activity and relationship to Great Northern
Corporation prior to that time had no relevance to the charge
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before the jury.

Additionally, such evidence was prejudicial

and could have had a substantial influence of the jury in that
it brought forth certain matters such as a proposed merger
that was never accomplished and a Securities Exchange Commission
ban on the trading in Great Northern stock —- the implication
from such evidence was that somehow defendant was responsible
for such.

It was defendant's contention that all such evidence

is irrelevant and remote in time from the charges filed but
the objections as seen below may come on different grounds
than these.

In order to clearly bring such matters before the

attention of the Utah Supreme Court, the following is an example
of some such evidence and the objections thereto:
In examining Robert Shields, the following dialogue took
place:
Q.

Did you have occasion to see him (Jack Facer)in
approximately August of 1972?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And did you have conversation with him about that
time concerning a stock by the name of Great Northern
Corporation?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And can you tell us where that conversation took
place?

A.

I believe it would have been at Ferraco's, downstairs
Felt Building.

Q.

In Salt Lake City?

A.

Right.

Q.

And who was present at that conversation if anyone
besides you and Mr. Facer?

A.

Himself and myself.

Q.
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Can you tell us what the conversation was?

MR. LEEDY: Objection, your Honor, on the grounds, its
remote in time from the indictment.
COURT:

Overruled.

Q.

Go ahead and tell us what the conversation was that
you were having with Mr. Facer.

A.

He had the opportunity to buy stock in Great Northern
Corporation and wanted to know if I was interested in
some of the stock . . .

Q.

Have you ever heard of the name American International
Travel Service Incorporated?

A.

I have.

Q.

And does that have any connection with Great Northern
Corporation, in any way?

A.

Not that I know of other than it was to be.

Q.

And how do you know that it was to be?

A.

I had a conversation with Mr. Facer that if certain
assets, certain things could be done and so forth
this was a good clean company and the stock in that
particular company and could be merged coming of three
shares of A.I.T. to go into one share of Great
Northern.

Q.

So he brought up to you the possibility of merger
between those two corporations.

A.

There was a possibility of a merger, Right?

Q.

And when did he mention that to you?

MR. LEEDY: Your Honor, can I object at this point, I
don't understand how we were in American International
Travel stock, it has nothing to do with the fraud that's
going in this case. (RT-334).
COURT:

Objection overruled.

MR. RANDLE:

Lay a foundation.

(further conversation) Yes.

(For some time after that examination centered upon
American International Travel Service and a proposed merger
with Great Northern Corporation.)

While still discussing

the proposed merger:
MR. LEEDY: If it please the Court, may I have a continuing
objection to all testimony concerning American International
Travel.
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COURT:

You may.

(RT-335).

Continuing on:
Q.

Why did you invest in American International Travel?

A.

Well, because,

MR. LEEDY:

Objection, irrelevant and immaterial. (RT-337).

Going back to the proposed A.I.T. merger Mr. Shields
testified:
Q.

So you were faced with the loss of how much then?

A.

On what?

Q.

On your A.I.T. stock in March of 1973.

A.

The A.I.T. Stock would have to be some good, $40,000 loss.

Q.

Mr. Facer wasn't faced with any of that loss, was he?

A.

We never discussed it.

(RT-339).

The proposed merger between Great Northern and American
International Travel was never alleged in the indictment
or in the Bill of Particulars.

The time of the proposed

A.I.T. merger was far remote from the time of the alleged
scheme in the indictment.

Mr. Shields, the person whose

testimony was just quoted was not even alleged to be a victim.
The defense can see in no way how such testimony relates to
a proposed scheme with which the defendant is charged and in
no way could be relevant or material, but was, in fact,
prejudicial because of the loss that was suffered in the merger
that never was accomplished.
Further pursuing the irrelevant proposed A.I.T. merger,
the prosecution examined their witness Gilbert W. Barnes:
Q.

And were you aware of the merger between American
International Travel and Great Northern Corporation?

A. Digitized
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Q.

And, in fact, you were Jack Facer's contact in
Las Vegas to arrange that merger? Were you not?

A.

Jack Facer's contact?

Q. Yes.
A.

No, I was a friend of Jay Finn's on that particular
thing . . . I don't recall when the merger was, I
don't know.

Q.

Well the testimony here is that it was in early October
of 1972, you don't recall even when it was? (This
is some seven months prior to the allegation of fraud
by the defendant Facer.)

Prosecution continued its examination of Gilbert Barnes
regarding American International Travel with the vein of
trying to prove that American International Travel was a
"shell" corporation.
Again, it should be pointed out that American International
Travel is not charged in the indictment nor named in the Bill
of Particulars.

The merger is not charged as being a part of

a fraudulent scheme, the date of the merger is more than half
a year prior to the date charged in the indictment and, obviously,
the term "shell corporation" is designed for prejudicial effect*
Examination (RT-445).
Q.

Excuse me, did you at any time see any financial
statement for Jay Finn's company at that time?

A.

You mean did I see a financial statement for International Air Travel?

Q. Yes.
A.

Well, I'm sure I would have looked at one.

Q.

What were the assets of the company at that time?

MR. LEEDY: Objection, your Honor, he is testifying as
to what is on the document is the best evidence.
COURT:

Sustained.
-22-
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MR. RANDLE: I show you what are entered into evidence
as State's Exhibit 62 and ask if you have seen that document before.
A.

I have.

Q.

Is that some sort of due diligence that you sent up
to Salt Lake . . .

(at that point a dialogue starts concerning the business of
Great Northern Corporation).
Q.

Isn't it true that American International Travel
Company was an old inactive company that belonged to
the Winstrom's?

A.

No, sir, it is not true.

Q.

Who did it belong to?

A.

Originally?

Q.

Well, just prior .

A.

The Winstrom's have never owned it, so I don't know
who all owned it through the history, but Winstrom's
never owned it.

Q.

Who were the stockholders in the company who arranged
for the merger?

A. I talked to the officer of the corporation which is
Carl Winstrom as president.
Q.

He is president of the company?

Q.

He doesn't own it.

Q.

Well he was a stockholder, wasn't he?

A.

Small stockholder.

Q.

He had control of the company and arranged for whatever
needed to be done for the merger didn't he?

A.

He was the president of the Company. I wouldn't
say he controlled and arranged it, he sent out stockholders' letters and had approval for what he did.

Q.

You helped him do that, didn't you?

A. Yes.
Q.

And you even went to the Secretary of State's Office
and got the company reinstated, didn't you?
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Q.

You changed the name?

A.

Right.

Q.

It was an old inactive company?

A.

It was a mining Company.

Q.

And it had some old mining claims in it, didn't it?

A.

At one time it had operated mines.

Q.

Did you have a mining claim when you were arranging
for the merger?

A*

I believe it still had some in there then.

Q.

Other than those old mining claims, did it have any
other assets?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Just an old shell, wasn't it?

A.

An inactive company for several years, it had been.

Q.

And just prior to the merger you didn't put any assets
in it, did you, didn't put any interest in it?

A.

No.

Q.

Did anyone?

A.

I don't remember, I don't think so.

Q.

And you had to go to the Secretary of State's Office
to get the company reinstated, isn't that true?

A.

I didn't get up there, I sent a letter.

Q.

You were the one that arranged to have it reinstated?

A.

I believe I paid for the filing fee and loan to the
company to the best of my knowledge, $1,000.00.

Q.

So if there was a merger between those companies
it was a merger between two shells, isn't that a
fact?

A.

No, its not a fact.

(RT-459).

Great Northern is not a shell . . .

The prosecution continues to examine along the vein that
American International Travel is a shell corporation.
-24-
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Again with Mr. Birkinshaw, the prosecution takes the same
tact as it did with Mr. Shields. First it discusses Mr.
Birkinshaw's first meeting with Mr. Morgan, with Mr. Facer and
the first contact with Great Northern Corporation.

All of these

are much prior to the time alleged in the indictment.

On

page 249 of the transcript Mr. Birkinshaw begins such testimony
by discussing his introduction to Mr. Facer in a bar in Salt
Lake City and conversation about Great Northern.
Q.

And how did you meet Mr. Facer?

A.

I was introduced to Mr. Facer by Howard Morgan.

Q.

And where was that?

A.

As I recall, it was at the Cabana Club.

Q.

Did Mr. Facer have a conversation with you at that
time concerning the stock of Great Northern Corporation?

MR. LEEDY: Objection, as irrelevant and immaterial, it's
remote in time from the time charged in the information.
COURT:

Objection overruled.

Q.

Yes, just relate the conversation to us. . .Mr. Facer
talked to you about the stock of the Company?

A.

We dealt with the stock, yes.

Q.

Well what did he ask you to do about the stock of
the Company?

A.

He wanted to know if perhaps I had brokers that might
be interested in retailing the stock.

Q.

Here in Utah?

A.

No, out of state.

Q.

He wanted you to retail the stock out of the state?

A.

Well, he wanted to know if I could create an interest
with brokers who might be interested in the retail
of the stock. (RT-250).
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mation and can only
be prejudicial
to the defendant Facer.

After the testimony just quoted the prosecution goes for quite
some time into the history of Mr. Facer and Mr. Birkinshaw's
dealings and also the history and business of Great Northern
Corporation.

Continuing on with the line of inquiry on

RT-253 the prosecution is now at the year 1973 and asked
questions:
Q.

Can you tell us what value of trading activity Mr.
Facer was having to do, how it progressed through
February and March.

MR. LEEDY:
COURT:

Objection, calls for a conclusion.

Rephrase it.

MR. RANDLE: How many trades did you do per day for
Mr. Facer during the month of February?
This period of time is some two months prior to the
indictment.

(RT-253).

MR. RANDLE: We are talking about February 6, approximately
when these stocks were suspended and I just want to know
if Mr. Facer said or did anything during your course of
dealing different than he had been doing at the time it
was suspended.
A.

Not at that time, nothing different that I recall.

Q.

The volume of transactions that occurred that
remained about same?

MR. LEEDY:
COURT:
A.

Objection.

Leading.

Sustained.

I don't think they remained about the same.

Then the prosecution goes briefly into International
Air Travel Service again (RT-282 - 283).
With the witness Howard Morgan, the prosecution attempted
to elicit a trading history for the market price of Great
Northern Corporation and attempted to show that the rise in
that market price, even though the rise occurred prior to the
-26-
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time alleged in the indictment (RT-220).

And, also, into a

history of che stock splits for Great Northern.

;

For example:

Q.

Can you tell us what the market activity in Great
Northern did just before the time of the first split?

A.

The stock went from $1.00 to, I can't remember, it
went up.

MR. LEEDY: If it please the Court, I'm going to object
unless there is a particular time period mentioned and
that the period of time of the forward split was from
March and April
Q.

Can you set a time please?

MR. RANDLE: I think you said that the first split took
place in September of 1972. The answer to that is correct.
MR. LEEDY: I'm going to object on grounds of relevancy
then, your Honor.
Although the Court sustained that objection at that time,
it later allowed testimony.
MR. RANDLE: All right, what was the stock selling for
after the second spurt in December of 1972?
MR. LEEDY: Objection, unless we have a time period,
your Honor, and if it's in September, I object on grounds
of relevancy.
MR. RANDLE:
COURT:

I said in December of the second split.

Objection overruled.

He may answer.

A.

As I recall it was about $3.00 per share. (RT-223).

Q.

Now what was the price activity after the second
spurt to the time that the market was pretty much,
well let's do it this way, I would like to offer
at this time the public document.

MR. LEEDY: Objection on grounds of relevancy, your
Honor . . .(Court overruled the objection R-224.)
MR. RANDLE: What was the market activity in Great
Northern stock, the market price and the value of, you
know from the date of the second split to February 6,
when the stock was suspended . . . .
Q.

Where was this conversation held?
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COURT:

Objection is overruled.

(RT-225).

A.

In September, 1972, an agreement was made between
Mr. Fallick and myself and Mr. Facer . . .

Q.

Tell us the conversation.

A.

The conversation was that he would .

MR. LEEDY: Again, your Honor, I am going to object
on grounds that it is remote in time.
COURT:

Objection will be overruled.

(RT-225).

On redirect the prosecution again goes into the question
of the incompleted merger with the shell corporation at a time
more than half a year prior to the time alleged information.
Q.

Who was Jay Finn?

A.

He was the president of International Air Travel
Service which was going to merge with Great Northern. .

Q.

Prior to the merger do you know whether or not Great
Northern would be anything more than a shell corporation . . . (RT-234).

Then an unaudited balance sheet was introduced into
evidence over objection for foundation.

(At the time the

defense also had a continuing objection of relevancy as to any
evidence regarding the company which was the prospect of the
proposed merger.)
Q. . Now in relation to your diligence work, did you
at any time receive any financial statement from
International Air Travel Service?
A.

I recall there was a financial statement in the
original due diligence package . . .

Q.

I show you what has been marked for identification
as proposed Exhibit 62f and ask if you can identify
that document?

A.

I can identify the first two pages.

Q.

All right, what are they?
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A.

That's an unaudited balance sheet and financial statement for the period beginning January 1, 1972, through
December 31, 1972, on International Air Travel Service.

Q.

Have you seen those documents before?

A.

Yes, it was part of a due diligence file.

Q.

And they were presented to you by officers of International Air Travel Service?

A.

I'm sure that's where they came from, they came in
the mail as far as I know.

Q.

Now this document that is filed in the due diligence
file intended for public information as to what
International Air Travel Service's assets and income
were supposed to be for 1972.

A. Yes.
Q.

And do you know if that was actually the document
issued by the Company?

A.

As far as I assume there are, yes. This comes in the
mail all the time to brokerage houses, but financial
statements which update the diligence packages. As
I say, it was brought in the office and was dropped
in my basket.

Q.

I will offer at this time, your Honor, State's proposed
Exhibit 62.

MR. LEEDY: Objection, no proper foundation. Can't see
the relevancy as to this defendant, I can't see the
relevancy as to the company. That's a company on International Air Travel Company.
The financial statements were for 1972, when the time in
question is March and April of 1973, and, also, there was no
evidence of who prepared the balance sheet.
COURT: Exhibit 62 will be admitted subject to a motion
to strike.
Further, the prosecution elicited into evidence, over objection,
from several witnesses, the fact that trading in the security
of Great Northern Corporation had been suspended by the SEC
in February, some two months prior to the time that the defendant
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is charged with having engaged in a scheme to defraud.

For

example, the witness Howard Morgan testified:
Q.

Now what
from the
let's do
a public

MR. LEEDY:

was the price activity after the second split
time that the market was pretty much — well
it this way, I would like to offer at this time
document.

Objection on grounds of relevancy, your Honor.

MR. RANDLE: This is duly exemplified and marked for
identification as the State's proposed Exhibit 66, which
is a certified copy of the order suspending trading of
Great Northern stock issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. I would like to offer that into evidence
at this time. (RT-223).
COURT:

What is the date of this?

MR. RANDLE:
COURT:

No, the date of the order.

MR. RANDLE:
COURT:

The date of the document?

The date of the order is February 6, 1973.

Be admitted.

MR. RANDLE: The date of this suspending of trade of
Great Northern stock by the SEC was February 9, 1973. . .
The prosecution pursued the same matters with the socalled victim Birkinshaw.
Q.

Can you tell us what happened at the time great
Northern stock was suspended by the SEC?

A.

Would you rephrase that please?

Q.

Can you tell me what happened with your transactions
with Jack Facer at the time Great Northern stock was
suspended by the SEC?

Mr. LEEDY: Objection, irrelevant and immaterial, asking
about a time that is a month before the time charged in
the information.
COURT:

Overruled. . .

He pursued the same subject matter with the witnesses
Robert Shields and Gilbert Barnes.

(See, e.g. RT-357).
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As with the questions dealing with the proposed but incompleted merger, the evidence about a Securities Exchange
Commission trading suspension on Great Northern stock was
completely irrelevant and immaterial to the time alleged in
the information and had no bearing or connection with the
alleged scheme or with the particular defendant, but would
serve to prejudice him as the evidence was obvious that he was
a man who was heavily involved in a stock which the government
stopped from trading.
In another area of evidence, the prosecution dealt with
aspects of the defendant's personal life which had again, no
bearing upon his trading in the securities of West Am, Great
Northern, or Silver Gull Oil and Gas during the period of
time alleged in the indictment.
First, the prosecution brought out a series of loans that
Mr. Facer had obtained some nine months prior to the time
charged in the information.
It was never entirely clear as to why the prosecution
brought up evidence of the loans as there is no evidence as
to why the loans were obtained or the use the loan proceeds
were put to.

However, the evidence was more prejudicial than

merely the fact that the defendant could not live on his
particular income, but required borrowing.

It came out into

evidence that the loans were secured by the defendant's home
in Salt Lake City which had been placed into his son's name.
The reason the home was in his son's name was not clear.

On

page 329
of the transcript, the following dialogue occurs:
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Q.

All right, did you have occasion to raise some money
for Mr. Facer in August of 1973? (that is meant to
be 1972).

A.

I did.

Q.

And did he ask you to do that?

A.

He discussed trading money and I suggested one thing
that we could do, I had done business with the Murray
First Thrift and I suggested there a possible means
of raising money.

Q.

And did you raise some money for him there?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Approximately what date did you obtain a loan from
there?
c

\

A

A.

It was the later part of August of 1972.

Q.

All right, what was used as security for that loan?

MR. LEEDY:
of this.
COURT:

I'm going to object, I don't see the relevancy

Overruled.

Q.

How much of a loan did you obtain there at Murray
First Thrift?

A.

The basic amount was $35,000 with costs included in
that amount. It was — the net amount was possibly,
after deductions, and so forth, against it, other
loans, some $25,000.

Q.

Do you recall what was used as security for that loan?

A.

The home that was in his boy's name at 1500 Princeton
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Q.

That was the defendant Jack Facer's home?

A.

The one he was living in.

Q.

And that was in his boy's name?

A.

I imagine so, because the loan had to be made out
in that fashion. (RT-330).

Some Great Northern stock was also used to collateralize
that loan, but it was in no way pointed out how that security
or any attribute of the transaction was in any way relevant
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to the case against the defendant.
stop there.

And the prosecution did not

On page 335 of the transcript the following

questioning and answering took place.
Q.

And I ask you, have you ever had an opportunity to
raise additional money for Mr. Facer subsequent to
the first loan you obtained for him?

A.

Yes, I did raise $5,000 for him.

Q.

And when was that?

A.

Possibly April.

Q.

Of 1972?

A.

Right.

Q.

So that was before the first loan you got on his
house?

A.

Right.

Q.

Now, subsequent to the loan that you obtained on his
home, did you have occasion to raise more money for
Mr. Facer? . . .

A.

I was approached by Mr. Facer for an additional loan
on his boy's house up on the east side and I also went
to Murray First Thrift and arranged for another loan
but in the sum of approximately $25,000, $20,000.

Q.

All right.

MR. LEEDY: May I have a continuing objection to all
testimony concerning the loans.
Again, there could have been no possible relevance to the
charges that on three occasions he had borrowed money and two
of such times he had used as security for the loan a home
on Princeton Avenue which was in a son's name.

Such evidence

was not only irrelevant and immaterial, but designed solely
to prejudice the defendant.
Additionally, the testimony about other losses that he
had caused to a particular person which were not involved in
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the charges in this indictment was irrelevant and prejudicial.
For example, Clifford Hughes testified as to losses that
the defendant had caused to him in dealings in January of
1973 at the brokerage firm of Transamerican Securities. On
page 180 of the transcript, the witness Hughes testified:
Q.

And, can you please tell us when Mr. Facer first
approached you about buying stock?

A.

I couldn't give you the exact date, he had bought
some through one of the houses in town prior to
1973 and I believe that he bought some in '72,
I'm not positive of that without looking actually
back to their records and looking.

Q.

What company was that?

A.

Transamerican.

Q.

And did he ask you to do anything in particular with
that company?

A.

He just asked if it was all right if he bought and
sold stock through one of my accounts and I said yes.

. . . on page 185 of the transcript:
Q.

Did you lose any other money as a result of your
transactions with Jack Facer during this period of
time?

A.

Yes. Mr. Facer had asked me to contact Von Jenson
who was a trader at Transamerican and tell him to
maintain the price of the stock and that he would
make sure the price stayed up there, which I did
and when the price fell, Duane Jenson, the owner of
Transamerican just put all of the stock in the account
of Transamerican into my account . . .

MR. LEEDY: I'm going to object. I don't know what this
has to do with the defendant or this lawsuit.
COURT: Well you might be getting a little far afield
at this time in connection with it.
MR. RANDLE:
A.

Silver Gull is one of the securities?

I understand that.

MR. LEEDY:

What day are we talking about?

MR. RANDLE: Mr. Hughes suffered other losses on other
transactions with Jack Facer at Transamerican Securities
because of this other.
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COURT:

Well go ahead.

Objection will be overruled.

And the examination continued on about losses that were suffered
by Cliff Hughes at Transamerican Securities none of which was
alleged in the information all occuring months prior to the time
that was alleged in the information.
Additionally, the Court allowed in evidence about a loss,
by a person other than a named victim, at a time other than
alleged in the information/ in a stock other than charged
in the information.

See RT-339 quoted at page 21 of the brief.

Additionally, the Court was continually erring in its
hearsay rulings.

On page 71 of the transcript the following

question/ objection/ and ruling occurred:
Q.

Why did you sell those stocks?

A.

The NASD was in our office and there was — they
said that the values of that collateral . . .

MR. LEEDY: I object to what the NASD told himf hour Honor,
objection on hearsay.
MR. RANDLE: It is not hearsay if he explains his motivation
for doing it.
COURT:

Overruled.

Throughout the testimony of Mr. Mawod the prosecution
attempted to elicit conversations between Mawod and Shields.
The defendant objected on grounds of hearsay/ but the prosecution
proferred that they would somehow tie the matter in and would
show that Shields was an agent of Facer.

All such conversations

were then allowed in subject to a motion to strike.

The hearsay

problems started on page 35 of the transcript when the following
examination of Mr. Mawod/ the prosecution's first witness/ occurred:
A.

And what/ if anything/ did he (Shields) say at the
time you contacted him?

MR. LEEDY:

Objection, hearsay.
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COURT:

finstainpH

MR. RANDLE: We'll show and connect up Mr. Shields as
acting as an agent for Mr. Facer, I think anything
that Mr. Shields is saying to anybody ought to be
admitted into this case because he is authorized by
Mr. Facer to conduct these transactions and we will
so connect that up.
COURT: Well, the objection will be overruled subject to
a motion to strike if you don't.
Shortly thereafter, the following occurred.
Q.

Did you have a conversation with him (Shields)
about the checks?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

What, if anything, did you say and what did he say?

MR. LEEDY: If it please the Court may I have a continuing
objection so that I don't need to keep interrupting
on both grounds of hearsay and foundation.
COURT:

You may, foundation.

MR. LEEDY: Foundation primarily, haven't shown Shields
as any sort of an agent of Mr. Facer.
COURT:

You may have a continuing objection.

From that point on the Court allowed into evidence any conversation that the witness Shields had with any other person.
In totality, the evidence shows that Mr. Facer and Mr.
Shields were interested in similar stock and that they had
some transactions together.

However, in no sense could the

evidence be construed to show that Shields was the agent of
Facer so that his conversations bound Facer.
described the relationships thusly.

Mr. Shields

At page 374 of his

transcript, he testified:
Q.

But this is true is it not, at the point when he first
ask he (Facer) first ask you if he could use your
account, that you knew he was extended and that's
why he ask you, isn't that right?

A.

Not necessarily.
-36Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

Isn't that what you testified previously to?

A.

The only thing of it is see, is he needed — I
voluntarily — we had been friends for some time
so I let him go ahead and do it. (Use Shield's
account at Mawod's). Why shouldn't I do it, we
were working together.

Q.

I wanted to hear you were working together. Were
you not?

A.

We done different things together, I had known
him for some time. I was not a partner of his, but
I believed in Great Northern, I liked Great Northern
so I done what I done.

Q.

Isn't it true Mr. Shields that Jack Facer came to
you and said Great Northern, I still think it's a good
buy, but I have bought all that I can and now could
I use your account?

A.

Now, it didn't happen in that manner, Jack Facer ask
me can he buy in my account, in mine. I said Jack,
this is fine if you have got the money to pay for it.
He assured me that he did have.

The totality of the evidence shows the above to be the
relationship between Mr. Facer and Mr. Shields.

Such could not

be construed to be an agency relationship whereby the conversations of Shield's are admissible against the defendant
Facer —

particularly in a criminal proceeding.

Utah Rules of Evidence.

See Rule 63(8)

Nor would such fall within the

exception found in Rule 63 (9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence as
the hearsay statements were after the complete execution of
the so-called scheme. Also, the prosecutor indicated his
belief in the declaror's innocence (RT-402).

Shields was not

a party to the proceeding at the time his conversations with
Mawod were brought into evidence because the State —
his innocence, see RT-402 —

believing

had dismissed charges, therefore,

such evidence was not admissible under Rule 63 (7) Utah Rules of
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Pursuant to the Court's suggestion at the close of the
evidence, defendant's counsel moved to strike all that testimony
(RT-478).

Although the Court never formally ruled on the motion,

it submitted the trial to the jury without an instruction as
to striking the testimony and, therefore, for all intents and
purposes did deny the motion.

During such hearsay testimony,

the jury heard such prejudicial evidence as:
A.

Yes, it was a suprise to me that Barbara Facer's
name was on the check, and I pointed this out and I
started to make — I made inquiry at that point as
to why her name was on the check.

Q.

What did Mr. Shields say?

A.

Well, he said that if I recall the first conversation
that that's where the money was coming from and that
the check would be made good (RT-37).

Q.

Which conversation was that?

A.

Well, I don't recall what sequence, but it was
the, the stories about the same in each of these
meetings that I had with Mr. Shields in that he
assurred me that it would be taken care of an each
time he made me aware that Mr. Facer was involved and
was going to . . .

(RT-37)

Objection was sustained at that point and a motion to strike
was not granted.
A.

(R-39). . .

And, yes, I think Gaylene was there, however, if
I remember he called me on the phone so he informed
me that a meeting was to be arranged and an attorney
by the name of Summerhays, offices of, Mr. Facer
was going to be there with some people and that
they were going to attempt to straighten the whole
thing out . . . (RT-45).

Exhibits were received in the same fashion.

On page 100 the

prosecution offered exhibits which had only been identified
by the witness based on his dealings with Shields:

Q.

At this time, your Honor, we would like to offer
exhibits into evidence as State's proposed Exhibit
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16, 16A, 16B, 17 and 17A, 18 and 18A, and 18B and 19
and 19A, 20, 20A, 21 and 21A, 22 and 22A, 23 and 23A,
24 and 24A, 25 and 25A, and 14 and 15.
MR. LEEDY: Objection, your Honor, on the grounds that
there is no connection with the defendant Facer.
COURT:

Objection sustained.

MR. RANDLE: We will connect it up, your Honor. I think
that Mr. Shields will adequately show as well as all
these matters that he was clearly acting as an agent for
Mr. Facer and performing these transactions for him. On
the basis of the profer we will again request that it be
admitted into evidence.

COURT: Well as to any of the exhibits that pertain to
Mr. Robertson, the Court will sustain the objection.
As to those exhibits which pertian to Mr. Shields, the
exhibits will be admitted subject to being striken
if he does not connect the matter up and we will have to
segregate them because I don't know. (RT-100-101).
Also evidence was elicited about instructions from Shields to
William Birkinshaw (RT-263).
It is submitted that the admission into evidence ~

as

shown above— of the following was erroneous:
1.

The defendant secured three separate loans some ten
months prior to the time alleged in the indictment
and his home was used to secure two of the loans.

2.

The defendant's home was in his son's name.

3.

Evidence that some persons bought stock and lost
money in American International Travel because the
merger didn't go through.

4.

Evidence that same year before the time charged in
the indictment Great Northern was a shell corporation.

5.

Evidence that there was a rapid rise in the market
price for Great Northern Corporation beginning 10
months before the time alleged in the indictment.

6.

Evidence that the SEC suspended trading in Great
Northern stock some two months before the time
charged in the indictment.
-39-
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7.

Evidence that other people at different times
lost money in other transactions with the defendant.

8.

Hearsay testimony indicating defendant was responsible
for transactions in accounts at Mawod & Company and
Heymond-Christiansen.

Defendant submits that each of the above was prejudicial
and improper and the cumulative effect requires a reversal
pursuant to Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AND FOR ARREST OF
JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
JURY IN THIS ACTION DID NOT PROVE THE COMMISSION OF A
PUBLIC OFFENSE.
The information by the state is very general and couched
in general language and difficult to determine the theory of
the State's prosecution.

However, from the Bill of Particulars

the State has enumerated the acts of fraud that the defendant
is charged with committing:
(a)

The defendant Facer did cause the stock of Great

Northern Corporation, West Am and Silver Gull to be bought and
sold/ thereby creating an artificial market activity and price
on said stock.
(b)

(R-39),

That the defendant executed the so-called float

trade whereby cash was obtained at the selling broker of
Continental Securities and the purchases at the remaining
"victim" brokers was not required to be paid for for a period
of seven days, (R-39),
(c)

That the above was accomplished and hidden from

the brokers involved by the use of nominees whose names were
used without their knowledge and the brokerage houses were
similarly unaware that the names used were, in fact, nominees.
(R-38),
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(d) That the defendant intended to pay for said purchases
with insufficient funds checks.
It is the defendant's position that the prosecution failed
to prove any of the above and that there was a reasonable doubt
as a matter of law and that the motion for a directed verdict
and subsequent motion for judgment for acquittal or arrest of
judgment should have been granted.
With respect to the State's first alleged element of
fraud; i.e., the float trades; the evidence was, as pointed
out before, the so-called victims either knew the trades in
question were float trades or acknowledged that the float trades
were common part of the industry.
With respect to the second element of the alleged fraud,
i.e., the use of nominees, when in fact, the nominees did not
know they were being used and the brokerage firm for the nominees
being used did not know in fact that such persons were nominees:
The evidence was completely to the contrary.

Not only did the

nominees know that they were being used, but the brokerage
firms knew, in fact, that such persons were nominee accounts.
With respect to Mawod, and Heymond-Christiansen the use
of Bob Shields' account stated he was liable for the account;
the same is true with respect to the Clifford Hughes account
at Mountain States Securities. Also Hughes and Shields placed
all the order themselves.
The third indicia of fraud, according to the state, was
the manipulation of the market price of Great Northern, Silver
Gull, and West Am Corporation stock.

There was absolutely
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no evidence of any kind with respect to manipulation of West
Am or Silver Gull Corporation.

The prosecution, indeed,

did bring into evidence a substantial amount of trading activity
by the defendant and several brokerage firms in Salt Lake City.
They contended that large trading activity was evidence of
manipulation.

However, such evidence proves absolutely nothing

unless there is evidence of the total trading activity in Great
Northern stock in all brokerage firms in the United States.
Without such evidence, we don't know that Mr. Facer's trading
activity was substantial in comparison to the total trading
activity.

If it was not, it obviously would not have any

effect on the market value.

Other than on the fact that Mr.

Facer traded heavily in Great Northern stock there is no
evidence to show that he manipulated the market.

Therefore,

the State's third indicia of fraud has totally failed.

In

fact, the evidence of Great Northern's market price showed
that from January of 1973 through the period in question,
the price was fairly stable with only a slight decline.
the price fell sharply.

Thereafte]

However, during the time claimed in

in the information, the market was stable.
Market manipulation is an essential part of the prosecution's
case.

Without proof of manipulation, there is no proof that the

defendant caused or intended to cause any loss to the alleged
victims.

The purchasing brokerage firms (victims) still retained

possession of the stock after the insufficient funds checks
were returned, and under brokerage firm rules, they had the
-42-
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right to keep or sell the stock.

If the price were the same,

there would be no loss; if the price moved down, there would
be a loss; but if the price moved up, the so-called "victim"
would have made a profit.

For example, defendant Facer sells

1,000 shares of Great Northern through Continental Securities
at a price of $3.00 per share.

On the same day at the same

time, through a nominee account at M. L. Fallick & Company,
he purchases 1,000 shares at $3.00.

That's the "cash trade".

However, he collects immediate cash from Continental of $3,000
less commission.

At this point he has $3,000 and owes M. L.

Fallick $3,000, and M. L. Fallick has the 1,000 shares of Great
Northern.

Under brokerage firm rules, he has seven days to

pay Fallick.

Now at the end of seven days, Birkinshaw or

Shields gets bad checks from Facer's wife and delivers them to
Fallick.

At this point Fallick merely deposits the checks,

but will not turn over the stock until it determines the check
is good.
stock.

Since the check was dishonored, Fallick retains the
If the price is still $3.00 Fallick has not lost

anything.

Therefore, to prove a scheme to defraud, it is

essential that the prosecution prove manipulation.

There

proof failed.
The fourth and final allegation of the scheme to defraud
was the use of bad checks to pay for the nominee accounts.
Again, it should be pointed out that these check were Barbara
Facer's checks which in no way could be said to be used to
conceal the identity of the true persons behind the accounts.
However, these checks were given some five to seven days after
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the purported purchase.

The brokerage firm gave absolutely

nothing in reliance upon said checks.

It is difficult to con-

ceive the bad checks would become a part of the scheme to
defraud, but additionally, Mr. Jack Facer was out of Utah at
the time the checks were obtained from his wife and tendered
to the broker who alleged to be a victim.

Incidentally, the

checks were obtained by and delivered by the so-called victim
William Birkinshaw and witness Shields.

The evidence was

conclusive that at the time in question Mr. Facer did not know
Mr. Birkinshaw had obtained checks from his wife and delivered
them to the brokers.
In view of the totality of the evidence, it seems that
there was no deceit or deception on the part of the defendant
and no reliance or intended reliance which are essential
requirements for fraud and that while the evidence may show
bad judgment in executing the so-called "float trades" and it
may show civil liability by the failure to pay for the purchase
in no sense can the State show the public offense of stock
fraud.

The case should be reversed and the charges against the

defendant should be dismissed.

^
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